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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAY A. THOMAS, for himself,
and JESSICA MAY THOMAS, an
infant, through her guardian,
JAY A. THOMAS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 14,224

vs.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant,
CAROL PAYNE HANSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent agrees with appellants' statement of the Nature
of the Case.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

'

Respondent agrees with appellants' statement of the
Disposition in the Lower Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the court affirm the lower court's
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with appellants' Statement of the
Facts.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
Respondeat contends the law in Utah on the Guest Statute
is a settled matter. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has
declared the Guest Statute constitutional and has ruled on both
points raised by appellants.
POINT I
UTAH GUEST STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND IS NOT IN VIOLATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Utah Court in the case of Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P, 2d 883 (Utah, 1974), declared the Guest Statute constitutional,
said opinion being more fully set forth as follows:
Jack] CANNON, Plaintiff and Appellant;
v.
Paula OVIATT et ah, Defendants
and Respendent.
Eugant-W. MARTIN, Guardian ad \\t*m for
Jackie A* Martin, a minor, Plain*
tiff and Appellant,
v.
Jay a JACKSON and Harold a Russell,
Dsfendants and Respondents.
Nos. I33S8, 13373.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 2d, 1974
Separate actions challenging constitutionality of the automobile guest statute.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor and S. Mark Johnson,
JJ-* upheld the constitutionality of the statute, and consolidated appeals were taken.
The Supreme Court, Callister, C J., held
that automobile guest statute did not deny
injured guests the equal protection of the
laws.
Affirmed.
Heariod, J-, concurred and filed opio-

I.'Atitom«M!ss<S»i3!{J)
Automobile guest statute was enacted
to provide some protection to a generous
host, who is sued by his invited guest for
ordinary negligence, when the rider has
given no compensation as an inducement
for making the trip or furnishing the carriage for the rider, to subservice the valid
legislative purpose of encouraging hospital*
ity in the use of the public highways. U,
GA.1953, 41-9-1.
2. Automobiles <S=>l8l(i)
Automobile guest is not placed in a
distinctive classification under automobile
guest statute, so as to require a finding
that the automobile guest alone, as a recipient of generosity, is deprived of the duty
of due care by his host. U.CA.1953, 4 1 -

W.
3. Atttomefelfee<3»l8l(l)
Automobile guest statute does not ere*
ate a distinctive classification for automo*
bile guests as compared to others insofar
as collusive lawsuits are concerned U , C
A.1953* 4 1 - M .

4. Ceeetltntieeal Law S»2U
Equal protection clause docs not com*Crockett,Digitized
J.# concurred
specially
and
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law to
School,
BYU. every aspect of a
pel aClark
state
attack
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
filed optmon.

ion.

problem or to refrain from any action at
all; it is sufficient that the states action
be rationally based and free from invidious
"•discrimination. Const art. 1, § 24; U.S.
GA.Cans&. Amend, 14.
5. Au'{*«««i»M4«.€B»i8ft{!)'
Co?nii*?ii0i»ai La* «5»243
Automobile guest statute did not deny
an injured guest equal protection of the
laws. U.CA.1953, 41-9-1; Const art 1, §
24; U.S.CA.Const Amend. 14.

Anthony M. Thurber,
for Cannon.
Curtis K. Oberhansley
Cook, of Kinghom,
O'Connell, Salt lake City,

Salt Lake City,
and Stephen W.
Oberhansly &
for Martin.

D. Gary Christian and Stevert H. Gunn,
of Kipp & Christian, Salt Lake City, for
Oviatt
Don J. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for Helsley, Moffat and Moffat
David E. West, of Armstrong, Rawiings,
West & Schaerrer, Salt Lake City, for
Jackson and Russell.

*

CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
The appeals of the plaintiffs, which
arose out of separate and unrelated actions, have been consolidated since they involved one common question of law, namely, was Section 41-9-1, U.GA.1953, unconstitutional? Each plaintiff, while a
guest in a motor vehicle, moving upon a
public highway in this state, sustained personal injuries in a vehicular accident
Each plaintiff initiated an action against
his host, the driver of the vehicle, to recover damages for the negligent operation
of the vehicle. Each host asserted Section
41-SM, U.CA, 1953, as a defense and denied liability. Each plaintiff urged unsuccessfully before the trial court that the
Guest Statute, 41-ft-l, U.CA. 1953, denied
him equal protection of the law under the
Constitution of the United States (14th
Amendment) and the Constitution of Utah
(Article I, Section 24).
I. SC*l^afi*l£»CaLBptr.33a > 3C«P^d212(iaTl).

On appeal each plaintiff relies on the
reasoning set forth in Brown v. Merlo/
wherein the Supreme Court of California
held that the proffijr^i justification for
that jurisdiction's guest statute did not
constitute a rational basis for the different
tial treatment accorded by the statutory
scheme of classification and wa3 therefore
a denial of equal protection of the law.
The Brown decision set forth two distinct
justifications for. the statute, the protection
of hospitality and the prevention of collu«
sive lawsuits. The court found the protect
tion of hospitality rationale fatally defective on the grounds: (1) It failed to explain why the statute accorded differential
treatment to automobile guests as dhtin*
guished from other guests* (2) In li.^h: of
recent developments in comparable legal
doctrines, the interest in protecting hospitality could not rationally justify the withdrawal of legal protection from guests.
(3) It ignored the prevalence of liability
insurance coverage today, which undermines any alleged rational connection between prevention of lawsuits and the protection of hospitality. The prevention of
collusive lawsuits rationale was determined
defective as overinclusive, since it barred
valid suits along with the fraudulent"
claims. The court further found that the
classification was aggravated by a serie*
of limiting loopholes, which stayed the op*
eration of the statute under a variety of
diverse and illogical circumstances. The
court explained that the numerous exceptions produced an absurd and illogical pattern which eliminated any rationality
which might conceivably be claimed for the
statute.
The California court stated that the statute established three distinct levels of classification: (1) The act treated automobile
guests differently from paying passengers.
(2) It treated automobile guests differently
from other social guests and recipients of
generosity and withdrew from auto guests
the protection from negligently inflicted
injuries generally enjoyed by a guest in
other contexts. (3) The act distinguished
between subclasses of auto guests, with*
holding recovery from guests injured while
"in a vehicle9* "during a ride" "upon a pub*
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He highway*' but permitted recovery hy the
guest injured ureter other ci ream stances.
According to the court, ih<i rationality of
the tripartite clarification scheme must be
evaluated in the light of the purposes of
the legislation. No other case had adjudicated the constitutional issue on this basis.
The court stated that the hospitality justification provided an inadequate explanation for the differential treatment accorded
to automobile guests as distinguished from
other guests. Under California law, guests
or recipients of hospitality may generally
demand that their hosts exercise due care
so as not to injure them.2 In a footnote3
the court explained that in 1929> the time
of enactment, the guest statute had a closer
relationship to general tort doctrine, since
at that time property owners owed a duty
of ordinary care only to invitees (business
visitors) and owed only some lesser duty
of care to licensees (social guests). Presently, in California, the general duty of ordinary care governs a landowner's duty to all
those injured on his property, social guests
and business visitors alike. Since the general tort doctrine has bsen modified, the
guest statute singles automobile guests for a
special burden and thus creates an arbitrary
and unreasonable classification. The court
reasoned that no realistic state purpose
supported the classification scheme of the
statute, since persons situated with respect
to the purpose of the law (recipients of
hospitality) do not receive like treatment
. The court stated that the statutory purpose of fostering hospitality cannot rationally justify the lowering of protection for
one class, namely, automobile guests as distinguished from paying passengers. The
court rdied on Rowland v. Christian4 and
stated that just as it was unreasonable to
lower the standard of care to a visitor on
private property because he was a'social
guest rather than a "paying" invitee, it was
unreasonable to single out an automobile

guest and expose him to greater danger
from negligence than a paying passenger.
The fact that the guest paid nothing did
not provide a reason to excuse the negii*
gence of the host.
The court further explained that the
characterization of the guest's lawsuit a3
an act of ingratitude had been completelyeroded by the development of almost universal automobile liability insurance coverage in recent years. Today, the insurance
company and not the generous host, was
the recipient of the protection of the guest
statute. The court was of the opinion that
the elimination of the guest doctrine would
in most cases shift the burden of loss from
the injured individual to the motoring pub*
lie rather than to the negligent host personally. The court concluded that the dis*
criminatory treatment of automobile guests
could not be upheld against the constitutional attack on the basis of the hospitality
justification.
Brown v. Merlo 5 is a logical consequence in that jurisdiction, stemming from
their prior determination to abandon th*
traditional tort doctrine that the status of a
person determined the duty owed to him.
In this jurisdiction the distinction between
"invitees" or .."business visitors" and "licensees** or "social guests" has been
preserved6 Thus the classification of an
automobile guest in Section 41-9-1, U.GA.
1953, does not single out this one group for
treatment different than accorded to other
guests* Likewise, the distinction between a
paying passenger and an automobile guest
has been retained in the correlative distinctions between an invitee and licensee.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, art automobile
guest has not been isolated from al! other
guests and recipients of generosity and
alone denied a duty of due care by his
host
As previously noted, the court in Brovrn
Ve Merlo T relied extensively on Rowland v.
Christian* to prove the invalidity of th*
hospitality justification for the guest stat*

2. Row**urf v. Cbrattai, 6$ CaL24 108, 70 CaL
Bptr. 37> 443 P.2* 535, 32 AJLRM 498
(1968).
Utak 2d 279, 333 PM 630 (1062) \ Tempi*
3. No. 6 at p. 395 o* 206 CftLRpte, DO, 0 at
v. RicfcanfeM, 5 Utah- 2d 174, 29& P.2d 124
p* 21i et 50G P.2&
(1966{; Hsrvtrd •. DowufA* 112 Utah 508*
4. State 2, *ap*«»
1S9 P.2* 444 (1948).
5. Note I , * * *
7* Not* 1* supptu
e. Btmm Digitized
v. Saltby Lato
Coeaty.
25 Vtnh
2d J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
184 41* *M 4M <1STO);
Wg*8 v. Woo*.
8 may contain
Machine-generated
OCR,
errors. sap**.
& Xot»2»

ute. This case 13 cited in 32 A.L.R.3d 513,
as part of the general trend in the field of
tort laws to eliminate technical status positions, which had the effect of insulating
certain classes from liability. In an explanatory footnote,3, it is stated:
This movement is" probably a result of
a general shift in the theory of tort law
from the emphasis on the regulation of
rights between individuals on the basis
of relative fault toward a viewpoint
which regards tort lam as a devic* for
social engineering, primarily concerned
with allocation of liability in such a
manner as to most satisfactorily protect
the social fabric from the impact of such
injuries as are a necessary or probable
consequence of the complicated organization of society, [Emphasis added]
Brown v. Mcrlo, in effect, elevated this
device for social engineering to the level
of a constitutional doctrine. First, by this
device as utilized in Rowland v. Christian,
the traditional distinction between invitees
and licensees was nullified, resulting in the
automobile guest alone being denied the
duty of ordinary care by his host Secondly, to nullify the hospitality justification,
the court directly incorporated the underlying rationale of social engineering, namely
that there should be an allocation of liability so as to protect the society from the impact of such injuries. The court stated
that the widespread use of liability insurance shifted all or part of the burden of
loss from the injured individual to the motoring public Through this process of social engineering a legislative enactment in
the area of economics and social welfare
was thrust into conflict with the modified
tort doctrine promulgated .by the court
The court was of the opinion that the statutory classification caused discriminatory
treatment to automobile guests and violated
the equal protection guarantees of the Ca!i«
fornia and United States Constitutions.
In evaluating the determination of the
California court that the statute was un»
constitutkmai, there are two decisions of
the United State© Supreme Court that support an opposite conclusion.
9. FoatBiH % p. 813 Qi » A.UE3&

In Silver v. Silver,10 the Connecticut
guest statute was claimed to deny equal
protection of the law on the ground that it
distinguished between gratuitous passecv
gers in automobiles and those in other
classes of vehicles. The court responded: 1 1
The use of the automobile as an in*
strument of transportation is peculiarly
the subject of regulation. We cannot
assume that there are no evils to be corrected or permissible social objects to be
gained by the present statute. We are
not unaware of the increasing frequency
of litigation- in which passengers carried
gratuitously in automobiles, often casual
guests or licensees, have sought the recovery of large sums for injuries alleged
to have been due to negligent operation
. . . . Whether there has been se.rious increase in the evils of vexatious
litigation in this class of cases, where
the carriage is by automobile, is for legislative determination and, if found, may
well be the basis of legislative action
further restricting the liability. Its wis*
dom is not the concern of courts*
In regard to the alleged discriminatory
classification, the court stated: **
• # . there is no constitutional requirement that a regulation, in other respects permissible, must reach every
class to which it might be applied—that
the legislature must be held rigidly to the
choice of regulating all or none. [Cita*
tions] In this day of almost universal
highway transportation by motor car, we
cannot say that abuses originating in the
multiplicity of suits growing out of the
gratuitous carriage of passengers in automobiles do not present so conspicuous
an example of what the legislature may
regard as an evil, as to justify legislation
aimed at it, even though some abuses
may not be hit
(Citations]
It is
enough that the present statute strikes at
the evil where it is felt, and reaches th*
class of cases where it most frequently
occurs.
tl. At pp. *22-123 of 280 U,S„ at p; 53 of
50 S.CC
IZ At pp. 323-14* of 280 TJJ3* at p> 50 of

tO. 280 U A UT, » S.Ct OTt 74 LJEd. 221
<1S»).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, BYU.
60 act
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A similar interpretation has been recently set forth in Dandridge v. Williams,13
wherein the court stated:
In the area of economics and social
welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clauie merely because
the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not oumd the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality/' [Citation] "The prob*
lems of government are practical ones
and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations—illogical, it may
be, and unscientific'* [Citation] MA
statutory discrimination will-not be set
aside if any state of facts may be conceived to justify it" [Citation]
*

*

*

•

*

*

. . . But the Equal Protection
Clause does not require that a State
must choose 'ottwten attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all. [Citation] It i3 enough
that the State's action be rationally
based and free from1 invidious discrimination
. . . .
The use of the motor vehicle upon the
public highways has b^tn validly subjected
to legislative regulation. The presence of
the guest in this area would itself create a
basis for a distinct classification from other guests located where there was no overwhelming public interest. The motor vehicle exerts a dominant influence in contemporary society and its use creates many
economic and social problems. In a state
such as Utah a significant portion of our
economic resources must be devoted to the
construction and maintenance of highways;
the economic burden bears a direct relationship to the number of vehicles and the
total cumulative mileage on the highways
each year. The guest statute encourages
hospitality and directly affects the number
of vehicles prestnt on the highways, thus
avoiding traffic congestion and wear to the
surface! of the roadway. The gues* stat*

13. S9T (J.& 471, 483, 486-4ST, 90 &£t
1153, n o . 2* T,iraat 4©i <i970).

ute promotes the conservation of petroleum
and other natural resources consumed in
highway travel. The. suggestion that the
burden of the injured guest should be
borne by the motoring public through liability insurance is an economic and social
solution that is properly subject to legislative determination. The Legislature is the
proper forum to consider the alternative
solutions for the problem of the injured,
guest The No. Fault Insurance Act, 3 1 41-1 et $zq.t ILCA. 1953, provides a com*
promise, the guest receives limiv*d compen*
sation for injuries, while- hosp*-a!ity is en*
couraged by not exposing the i ist to un*
limited liability and staggering insurance
rates. . The suggested simplistic solution
that the motoring public should bear the
costs of the injured guests ignores the eco*
nomic consequence that increased claim*
. will be reflected in increased insurance
rates, creating an -economic hardship on
the generous host and chilling hospitality.
[1,2] Section 41-9-1,. U.GA. 1933, was
enacted to provide some protection to a
generous host, who is sued, by hi3 invited
guest for ordinary negligence, when the
rider has given no compensation as an inducement for making the trip or furnishing
the carriage for the rider.14 This act sub~
served a valid legislative purpose to *n««
counige hospitality in the use of th^ public
highways. Furthermore, the * automobile
guest in this jurisdiction is not placed in a
distinct classification, where he alone as a
recipient of generosity is deprived of the
duty of due care by his host
[3] In Brown v. Merlo1-1 the court
stated that the second justification for the
guest statute was the prevention of collusive lawsuits. The classification in the
statute was allegedly predicated on. the
concept that a driver who gave a fret ride

to a passenger was motivated by his clos#
relationship with hia guest, and the driver
might admit liability to assist the guest in
collecting from the inruranee company.
The court rejected thi* rationale ot% the .
ground that though prior caselaw intra*
family tort immunity had been rejected

14. *»«•*Digitized
r. M mby,the4Howard
Utafc W.
2d Hunter
3 % 294
P.
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
15. Not* 1* svptft*
2d 683 (lifii).
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The court cited Klein v. Klein l s wherein it
rejected a claim that the possibility of
fraudulent lawsuits between a husband and
wife served as. a sufficient justification to
bar alt interspousal negligence actions. In
Hubalcava v. Cisseman,17 thi3 court held
that a wife may not maintain a tort action
against her husband or his estate. This
court declined to follow Klein v. Klein and
stated that the legislature and not this
court was the proper forum to change this
rule. Thus in Utah the guest statute does
not create a distinct classification for automobile guests as compared to others insofar
as collusive lawsuits are concerned.
The court stated in Brown v. Merio u
that the numerous statutory exceptions had
rendered recovery or lack of recovery under the guest statute largely fortuitous and
added another element of irrationality to
the statutory scheme. The court explained
that iht relationship giving rise to liability
between the driver and occupant might
fluctuate during the course of a single
ride, as circumstances brought them within
and without the language of the statute.
The court observed that the statute distinguished guests on the basis of (1) whether
or not the journey had come to a momentary halt; (2) whether the guest _ was
physically located inside or outside the
car; (3) whether the car was on a public highway or private land. The court
found that these statutory exceptions operated so illogically as to cause serious inequality and that they did not bear the remotest relation to either the objective of
protecting hospitality or preventing collusive lawsuits. Th*s court concluded that
under these circumstances, the limiting
provisions of the statute constituted further denial of equal protection.

while; the vehicle was stopped, however
briefly and for any purpose. This court
stated :2d
It is our opinion that a sensible and
realistic application of this statute, in
conforrriity with its objective, requires
that the protection extend over the entire
host-guest relationship in connection
with the giving and taking of the ride.
. • . the host-guest relationship here
must also include getting into the car at
the beginning and getting out of it when
the ride is completed and any incidents
which happen in the course of and arising
out of the ride . . - .
[4,5] The interpretation of the guest
statute by this court has averted the alleged irrationality in the statutory classification which disturbed the court in Brown
v. Merio, Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause does not compel the State to
attack every aspect of a problem or to refrain from any action at all; it is sufficient that the State's action be rationally
based
and
free
from
invidious
discrimination.21
The rulings of the trial courts in these
actions sustaining the constitutionality of:
Section 41-5-1, U.CA. 1953, are affirmed.
Costs are awarded to defendants,
ELLETT and. TUCKETT, JJ., concur.
HENRIOD, Justice (concurring).
I concur, except to say that I can see no
relevancy whatever in the case of Andrus
v. AH red, cited in the opinion, as to the
facts or problems involved in the instant
case.

CROCKETT, Justice (concurring specially).
In Andrus v. Alired,33 this court stated
I am impelled to forswear joining in ex*
that Section 41-9-1, U.GA.1953, should be
.
patiation
upon a case of a sister state,
given a sufficiently practical and reason*
which
we
decline to follow anyway. In
able application to cover incidents which
addition to not being binding on us in
occur as an integral part of the ride. This
any event, it is decided against a back*
court declined to give the statute such a
ground
of law significantly different from
• narrow ami literal interpretation as to
our
own,
and it impresses me as mainly
eliminate incidents which might occur
concerned with rationalizations toward *
18. 53 CaJja m, 29 CalSptt. 102; 378 PJ2d
19. 17 rtoh 2d 106, 404 J>M 972 (1965).
70 (IS©).
20. At p. UO of 37 Utah 2d, at p. 974 o« 404
17. 14 Utali 24 344, 384 P^d 3 » (1963).
P.2d.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
18. Note 1, rapn.
21.contain
DaadrMgo
Machine-generated OCR, may
errors. v. Wfflla«% not* 13, sapca.

desired result of repudiating their statute.
Consequently, I desire to state briefly my
own reasons for refusing to strike down
our own:
(1)

.

Our guest statute was enacted by
the legislature advisedly, to alleviate actual abuses which had occurred, and were occurring. 1

t. See disctreatoa of ja*tiSc*Hoa ol this statute bas**] on thfr usa of automobit** as such
• 8u essential and imixjrtaat aspect of irodern
Jiving that it is au appropriate subject for special classification and legislation therioa, and
tlm salutary pun***** justifying: the statute &$
s*t forth by Justic* Worths in Jensen v.
Mower, 4 Utah 2d 338, 204 P2Ct 683; ami
se* aba Andrns v. Allwd, IT Ut«h 24 108,
404 PJM 9TZ

(2)

Although it has not complet-iy
cured the ills it was aimed at, when
property applied, it has had the salutary effect of minimizing them.

(3)

It has been in effect for over 40
years. 2

Inasmuch as it came into being as an e x pression of the will of the people through
legislative enactment, if there is to be any
such substantial and important c h a n g - in
the law it should be by that same process,
and not by judicial pronouncement. 3
2. Originally emuted in Chap. 52, S.UU.1035,
.3. Se« statement Stanton v. .Stanton, 30 Utah
2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010, and authorities th«w»
in cited.

POINT II
THE DECEDENT CHILD WAS A GUEST WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
UTAH GUEST STATUTE.
Utah, by decision, in the case of Favatella yf

Fouls en«

403 P. 2d 918, has settled the law in Utah that a child is a
guest within the meaning of the Utah Guest Statute, said opinion
being more fully set forth as follows:
Diane FAVATSI.LA, by and through har
guardian ad Dtsm, Felix E* FavataHa,
Plaintiff and R«po»d»»t,
v.
Jean W. POULSHN a*d Mary Et!#* Carter,
DafarrriaifU and App&Nanla*
No. 10254.
Supreme Court ctUtah.
J u l / 7,1985.

Appeal sustained with order to cnt«r
judgment of no cause of action.

Automobilss <S=»J81(2>
Where teacher was driving a sevenyear-old girl to school, with consent and
solicited approval of parents, and WAS in*
voWed in an accident, guest statute.precluded passenger's recovery for injuries
sustained U . C J U 9 5 3 , 41-9-1.

Petition by motorist to dismiss action
on ordinary negligence brought agaiast her
Raymond M. Berry, Ernest F, Baldwin,
by passenger for injuries sustained in coU
Jr., Salt Lake City, for appellants*
lisioo. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
Dwight L King, Salt Lake City, for
County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., denied the
respondent.
petition and the motorist appealed The
Supreme Court, Henriod, C J., held that
HENRIOD, Chief Justice,
wherei motorist was driraf a seven-yearInterlocutory appeal from an order deny*
old girl to school, with consent and solicited
ing
defendants* petition to dismiss* The
approval o£ parents, and was involved in
appeal
sustained
and the trial court i*
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by the
Howardprecluded
W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law is
School,
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may
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ordered
to
enter
judgment
of no cause of
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action in favor of defendant Carter, with
no cost; on appeal awarded.
Carter, a teacher, with the consent and
apparently solicited approval o£ the parents,
customarily drove the latters* seven-yearold girl to school. The teacher was involved in an accident, and the little girl
was injured. The girl sued, bottoming her
complaint on ordinary negligence, and it
was conceded that there was no question as
to drunkenness or wilful misconduct. Miss
Carter countered by saying that our "giiesfe"
statute x precluded recovery. We think
f. OSfia 41-&-1, Utah Cod* AaaofcUed 1933.
2. 14 Utah 2d 18, 3T8 P.2d 541 (1962);
se* ala* H*ar*crfdi r. O. S. L. RK., 70
Utah 552, 2S2 P. 100 (1927); \Telker
v. Sorensos, 209 Or. 402, 303 PJ2d 73T
(1957).

she is right, as a casual reading of that
legislation will indicate.
Plaintiff relies heavily on Smith v. Franklin,- decided by this court recently. A
casual reading of that case emphasizes its
complete dissimilarity.
To espouse -plaintiff's theory of nonconsensuality of a minor in the "guest" statute
sense would be to allow recovery by a
gestating, unborn, injured infant, where its
mother, truly a guest, suffers a miscarriage,
the facts of life of which may have been a
complete mystery to the Good Samaritan
host

MCDONOUGH, CROCKETT, WADE,.
and CALLISTER, ]J.f concur.

CONCLUSION
Utah, by judicial decision, has ruled that the Guest Statute,
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is constitutional
and is not a violation of the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of the State of Utah, and has further
declared that a child is a guest within the meaning of said
Guest Statute*
Respectfullyjiikgiitted,

/

X
)afendant-Respondent
ttorne
48
48 North Un fezaxty Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
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